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Monday, November 5, 2007 Volume 11 Number 205
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End Note
GEORGIAN AUTHORITIES RULE OUT CONCESSIONS TO OPPOSITIONBy Liz Fuller The opposition National Council mobilized between 30,000-50,000 sympathizers from across Georgia on November 2 in a demonstration in Tbilisi in support of its demands to the country's leadership, which in turn categorically ruled out any concessions. The demonstrations continued on November 3, 4, and 5, but whether the opposition can maintain its cohesion and sustain the pressure on the authorities remains unclear. The National Council, composed of 10 opposition parties with widely disparate ideologies and agendas, was established in early October following the arrest of former Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili 48 hours after he publicly leveled a series of damaging accusations against President Mikheil Saakashvili. The National Council includes the People's Party, the Labor party, the Republican party, the Conservative party, Georgia's Way, Tavisupleba, Chven Tviton (We Ourselves), and Okruashvili's For a United Georgia, and is headed by a five-person Emergency Committee whose members include former Minister for Conflict Resolution Goga Khaindrava and parliamentarians Levan Gachechiladze (New Conservatives/New Rightists) and Koka Guntsadze, who defected from the New Rightists and is now a leading member of Okruashvili's party. On October 17, the National Council unveiled a joint manifesto that repeated many of the criticisms of the Saakashvili regime expressed on September 25 by Okruashvili. It characterizes the social, political, and economic situation in Georgia as "grave," accuses Saakashvili and his "corrupt team" of "usurping power," and claims that "political terror...reigns, and basic human rights and freedoms are neglected." It called for the consolidation of Georgian society to elect in free and fair elections in the spring of 2008 a new leadership that would enjoy public trust and prove capable of tackling the serious problems the country faces. It further enumerated 12 "fundamental principles" to which the 10 signatories pledged to adhere. Those principles are holding democratic elections without interference from state institutions; creating a European-style system of checks and balances between the branches of power; ensuring the independence of the judiciary; restoring Georgia's territorial integrity by peaceful means; strengthening local self-government and abolishing the post of presidential representative introduced by Saakashvili; releasing all political prisoners and launching an investigation into high-profile crimes committed under Presidents Eduard Shevardnadze and Saakashvili, including the deaths of former President Zviad Gamsakhurdia in 1993 and of Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania in February 2005; guaranteeing media freedom; strengthening property rights and compensating those whose property was summarily confiscated under Saakashvili; promoting a free business climate, attracting investment and creating new jobs; providing adequate financial support for the more disadvantaged segments of the population; ending state interference into the affairs of the Georgian church; and pursuing a pro-Western foreign policy that would include Georgia's disengagement from the Commonwealth of Independent States. The manifesto did not, however, explicitly advocate the abolition of the presidency. "Georgia Without Saakashvili" was one of the slogans under which Georgians initially flocked to protest Okruashvili's arrest. Later on October 17, the opposition addressed a letter to Saakashvili and to parliament speaker Nino Burjanadze highlighting its four most crucial demands: that parliamentary elections be held on schedule in spring 2008 (Saakashvili decided last year to postpone them until the fall to be held concurrently with an early presidential ballot, technically not due until early 2009); the creation of new election commissions that would not be monopolized by representatives of Saakashvili's United National Movement; the abolition of the majoritarian election system; and the release of all political prisoners. Throughout October, leaders of the parties aligned in the National Council toured Georgia in a bid to mobilize public support in advance of the planned November 2 rally in Tbilisi. That rally was intended to highlight only the opposition's four most crucial demands. But after leading parliamentarians, including speaker Burjanadze and Maia Nadiradze, categorically rejected late on November 2 the demand for parliamentary elections in the spring of 2008, demonstrators began on November 3 also demanding that Saakashvili resign. Statements by the various leaders on November 2 and 3 also highlighted differences between them as reflected in their rhetoric and the tactics they advocate. One of the more moderate representatives, People's Party leader Koba Davitashvili, who quit Saakashvili's United National Movement in early 2004, affirmed that "We do not want a revolution, we want elections. We are leaving the authorities room to make a face-saving decision.... I am sure the authorities will compromise.... Our demands are not ultimatums," civil.ge reported on November 2. The BBC similarly quoted Kakha Kukava, a lawmaker from the opposition Conservative Party, as saying: "We are not calling on people to stage a revolution, we are calling for protest. We are demanding fair elections, and we think it's very important for Georgia to set a precedent by replacing the government on the basis of elections, not of a revolution." A second Conservative parliamentarian, Zviad Dzidziguri, was more categorical, telling demonstrators "the four-year illness of the National Movement has ended and it has passed away. The verdict has been pronounced: this government should go, it should be thrown into the political garbage can." And veteran oppositionist Irakli Tsereteli, who began his career in the 1980s alongside then-dissident leader, later President Zviad Gamsakhurdia, warned that "if Saakashvili does not make concessions, we shall declare national protests [and] blockade the parliament, government, and Interior Ministry buildings." The response of the Georgian authorities has to date been measured. In a live television address on November 4, President Saakashvili implicitly argued that the opposition protests are being orchestrated from Moscow. That argument is less than convincing given that the 12th principle enshrined in the opposition manifesto is unswerving adherence to Euro-Atlantic integration, and in light of the recent visits to Paris, Brussels, and Washington by the leaders of several of the parties aligned in the National Council to outline their concerns over many of the actions and policies of Saakashvili's government. Saakashvili further dismissed the ongoing protests as a pale imitation of those in November 2003 that culminated in the so-called Rose Revolution that brought him to power. Like parliamentarian Nadiradze, he categorically rejected bringing forward the parliamentary elections to the spring of 2008. Nadiradze's rationale for that rejection was that "a country at war" should not hold elections, while Saakashvili implied that Tbilisi will fully restore its control over the breakaway unrecognized republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia before those elections take place. Other representatives of the Georgian leadership are apparently also counting on the opposition protests gradually losing momentum: parliamentarians Giga Bokeria and Givi Targamadze were both quoted on November 4 as affirming that police will not intervene to disperse the protest as long as it remains peaceful. But the room for compromise between the two sides is minimal, and neither appears prepared to back down. In the event of a protracted standoff, foul play in the form of a deliberate provocation to incite a clash between protest participants and police that would discredit the opposition cannot be definitively ruled out.
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